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FORGETTING FURMAN: ARBITRARY DEATH PENALTY
SENTENCING SCHEMES ACROSS THE NATION
Sarah A. Mourer*
Arbitrary: /a:bIt(r)ri/ Adjective
1. based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any
reason or system.
2. (of power or a ruling body) unrestrained and autocratic in the
use of authority.1
INTRODUCTION
In 1976,2 the poor, the forgotten, and the minority were condemned to die by
juries who were not given adequate standards. In 2013, the poor, the forgotten and
the minority are condemned to die by judges who are not given adequate standards.
The decision in Furman v. Georgia3 was in response to discriminatory death-penalty
decisions made by juries. The legislature has forgotten the lessons taught by Furman
and today, the “untrammeled discretion”4 once held by juries is now held by the ju-
diciary. Many death penalty sentencing procedures are unconstitutional, in violation
of both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, because the judge alone is authorized to
sentence the defendant to life or death despite being uninformed of the jury’s factual
findings. Pursuant to the Sixth Amendment as articulated in Ring v. Arizona,5 the fac-
tual findings upon which a death sentence rests must be found by the jury, and only the
* Sarah Mourer is an Associate Professor of Clinical Legal Education at the University
of Miami School of Law. She is the director of the school’s Innocence Clinic and Death
Penalty Project. Professor Mourer wishes to thank Kyle Swick, Scott Sundby, Donna Coker,
Pat Gudridge, Steve Mourer, Mary Mourer, Donna Coker, Scott Rogers, Craig Trocino,
Michael Froomkin, Jill Barton, Rebecca Sharpless, Jason Rozenwiez, and David Freitas for
their support in the writing of this Article. Sergio Campos was particularly instrumental in
the writing and development of this Article by encouraging and inviting Professor Mourer
to present the Article to the University faculty. Many thanks to Sergio and everyone who at-
tended the talk and provided valuable feedback that helped to refine and complete the Article.
1 Arbitrary Definition, OXFORD DICTIONARIES ONLINE, http://www.oxforddictionaries
.com/definition/english/arbitrary (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
2 For convenience, the feminine pronoun will be used throughout this Article. Masculine
pronouns could have been used equivalently.
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
4 Id. at 247.
5 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
1183
1184 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1183
jury.6 Nevertheless, many jurisdictions permit the judge to override a jury’s sentencing
recommendation even when the jury does not disclose their factual findings to the
judge.7 In other words, many states sanction judicial death-penalty sentencing when
the judge lacks any knowledge of the basis for the jury’s recommendation. When a
judge is confronted with making a death penalty sentencing decision, she is legally
prohibited from making a factual assessment on which to base that decision.8 Conse-
quently, she can only do one of three things, all of which are illegal: (1) she could
make her own factual findings based on the evidence in violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment; (2) she could guess what factual findings the jury made; or (3) she could base
her decision on her own personal preconceptions and biases. Effectively, the judge
must either violate the Sixth Amendment or make an arbitrary decision using guess-
work or bias. A heightened risk of arbitrary judicial death sentencing developed as a
result of the directive against judicial fact-finding in death-penalty sentencing. Recal-
ling Furman v. Georgia,9 an arbitrary decision violates the Eighth Amendment as
cruel and unusual punishment.
Judges and juries are human, with all of their attendant natural inadequacies and
preconceptions. Yet, judges and juries differ in one meaningful way: Juries consist of
a group of individuals and the judge is one person. One person may more readily intro-
duce her own value system or notions into a decision-making process. Therefore, the
Sixth Amendment provides the right to a jury trial.10 It attempts to protect defendants
in criminal trials from partial or biased decisions. The Sixth Amendment entrusts the
fact-finding power to a group of people, as opposed to one judge who could poten-
tially exert her authority in an unfair or biased manner. Presumably, if a majority or
unanimous decision is made by a group of at least six people, one person’s individual
biases or preconceptions cannot ordinarily dominate the decision-making process.
In fact, judges may be more likely to make discriminatory decisions in an effort to
pander to community standards as a result of the election process.11 Nonetheless, both
judges and juries hand down questionable verdicts thought to be a result of bias or
6 Id. at 609.
7 See William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination
of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 937–39 (2006).
8 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
9 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 277.
10 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previ-
ously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
11 See Richard L. Hasen, “High Court Wrongly Elected”: A Public Choice Model of
Judging and Its Implications for the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1313 (1997).
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preconceptions.12 There will always be significant potential for social influence to
operate in the legal system.13
In 1972, Furman v. Georgia held that the death penalty, as applied at that time,
violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.14 The case
concluded that juries had “untrammeled discretion” in deciding who lives or dies.15
Juries were provided no guidance in their decisionmaking and were left with little
more than their own human biases and personal value systems to govern their deci-
sions. The result was that a disproportionate number of poor, minority, and black
individuals received the death penalty.16 Thus, Furman effectively banned the death
penalty in the United States until jurisdictions implemented specific procedures and
guidelines for capital sentencing. In response to Furman, the states and federal govern-
ment established standards for capital sentencing. Accordingly, the death penalty sen-
tencing schemes and procedures designed by many states led to the reinstitution of the
death penalty in America.17 Several states that maintain the death penalty in the United
States18utilize capital-sentencing standards that result in the arbitrary imposition of the
12 Certainly, history proves that groups of people can also exhibit bias and predispositions
unanimously or as a group decision. This topic is beyond the scope of this Article. It is, however,
worth mentioning that many factors contribute towards a biased jury verdict. The personality
make-up of the jury and the dominance of the foreperson is only one example. Occasionally,
a strong and authoritative person may become foreperson with a jury comprised of “followers.”
“Followers” are those jury members who do not voice their opinion and tend to follow the
leadership in the jury room. Other factors include the social media of the day in ways that pow-
erfully affect entire communities. Bias may also pervade jury decisions when the law is not made
clear or the juries’ instructions are vague and difficult to follow. See generally NEIL VIDMAR
& VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007); Stephen A. Mourer, Response
Set in Personality Assessment, ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, Dec. 1, 1968, at 763–65.
13 See PHILIP G. ZIMBARDO & MICHAEL R. LEIPPE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDE
CHANGE AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE 291 (1991). “[M]ost evidence is subjective, a matter of
interpretation,” and often evidence is verbal, in the form of peoples’ words; thus, social influ-
ence enters into the very production of such evidence. These two variables are magnified by
the fact that the justice system runs on an adversarial model in which two sides investigate
and present competing versions of the truth and alternative views on what are the facts. Id.
14 “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
15 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 245–47 (1972) (citing McGautha v. California, 402
U.S. 183, 207 (1971)).
16 See infra notes 161–68 and accompanying text.
17 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 381 (1999); Tuilaepa v. California, 512
U.S. 967, 973 (1994); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195–96 (1976).
18 Thirty-two states and two American jurisdictions maintain the death penalty. The fol-
lowing states and jurisdictions still impose the death penalty:
Alabama Louisiana Pennsylvania
Arizona Mississippi South Carolina
Arkansas Missouri South Dakota
California Montana Tennessee
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death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment. These arbitrary schemes run the
same risk of potential bias and prejudice in death sentencing as did the pre-Furman
death cases and place fairness at great risk in the judicial process.
In Ring v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court held that capital defendants are en-
titled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense.19 Ring was convicted by a jury of felony murder.20 Ring could not be sentenced
to death unless additional factual findings were made by the judge at a sentencing
hearing, in the absence of a jury.21 At this hearing the judge determined aggravating
circumstances22 (facts that increase the gravity of the crime or escalate pain to the
victim) and mitigating circumstances23 (anything in the life of the defendant which
Colorado Nebraska Texas
Delaware Nevada Utah
Florida New Hampshire Virginia
Georgia North Carolina Washington
Idaho Ohio Wyoming
Indiana Oklahoma
Kansas Oregon U.S. Gov’t
Kentucky U.S. Military
States with the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo
.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
19 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
20 Id. at 591.
21 Id. at 594.
22 An aggravating circumstance is a standard to guide the jury in
making the choice between the alternative recommendations of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole or death. It is a statu-
torily enumerated circumstance which increases the gravity of a crime
or the harm to a victim.
An aggravating circumstance must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt before it may be considered by you in arriving at your recommenda-
tion. In order to consider the death penalty as a possible penalty, you must
determine that at least one aggravating circumstance has been proven.
FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, ch. 7.11 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5) (West
2010)), available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/jury_instructions/chapters/chapter7
/p2c7s7.11.rtf.
23 A mitigating circumstance is not limited to the facts surrounding the
crime. It can be anything in the life of the defendant which might indi-
cate that the death penalty is not appropriate for the defendant. In other
words, a mitigating circumstance may include any aspect of the defen-
dant’s character, background or life or any circumstance of the offense
that reasonably may indicate that the death penalty is not an appropriate
sentence in this case.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 2010)).
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potentially renders the death penalty inappropriate), and may impose death only if he
finds at least one aggravator and no mitigators that outweigh the aggravator(s). The
judge in Ring found that two aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the mitigation did not outweigh these aggravators.24 Thus, the judge, alone, did
the fact finding that led to the finding of the aggravating factors necessary to enhance
Ring’s sentence to death. Relying on the Sixth Amendment,25 Ring held that the fact
finding necessary to put a person to death must be done by the jury.26 Therefore, the
jury, not the judge, must determine whether aggravators that are conditional for the
sentence of death were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Although Ring was decided under the Sixth Amendment, many of today’s jury
instructions and capital-sentencing schemes also violate the Eighth Amendment as
arbitrary punishment. When a death-penalty scheme does not require jury unanimity,
the jury provides only an advisory recommendation to the judge, and especially if the
jury does not disclose which aggravators it determined were proven beyond a reason-
able doubt, then the sentencing scheme is arbitrary and unconstitutional. It is arbitrary
because the judge, as the sentencing authority, must then use guesswork and conjecture
in determining which aggravators the jury did or did not find proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. Pursuant to Ring, the judge is constitutionally prohibited from determining
whether the sentencing aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.27 At the
heart of Furman is the belief that if a defendant’s life is at stake, the sentencing deci-
sion must be made pursuant only to specific boundaries and clear guidelines.28 Al-
though Furman reviewed decisions made by juries, judges are no less likely to allow
personal feelings to influence decisions when not structured by specific parameters
that must be followed. When a judge is left uninformed about the facts that she should
use or not use when deciding a person’s life or death, this exemplifies arbitrary punish-
ment as described by the Eighth Amendment.
No death-penalty scheme can completely control or correct the biases and indi-
vidual dispositions of judges or juries. This is true for any criminal case or trial; the
human condition is a part of the criminal-justice system, for better or for worse. Bias
and prejudice can be contained and reduced but cannot be entirely eliminated.
The question ultimately is, therefore, how much bias and error should society tol-
erate in death-penalty cases?29 Human temperaments and personal bias will always
24 Ring, 536 U.S. at 594–95.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
27 Id.
28 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 247–48 (1972).
29 Consequently, any death sentence is based in large part on the jury’s or judge’s personal
notions and impulses, thereby arguably rendering any verdict arbitrary in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Given the finality and the various problems with the death penalty, including
its unique place in the human psyche, no capital system of procedures, parameters, or poli-
cies can provide the justice system with the power to make capital sentencing fair, just, and
logical. These various problems include but are not limited to: lack of deterrence of the death
penalty, increasing awareness of wrongful convictions and risk of the execution of an innocent
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factor into judges and juries’ decisions. These propositions are supported by recent
studies and research demonstrating that the death penalty is still disproportionately
applied to the poor and minorities.30 Although the death penalty in America may be
on its way out,31 it remains in effect today and it is, therefore, incumbent on states to
develop schemes that are reasonably systematic and logical, and that leave the decision
fully with the jury pursuant to the law.32 There are schemes that can reduce the level
of arbitrariness in the judge’s review of juries’ recommendations as well as provide
judges with better guidance in their decisionmaking.33 Due to the finality of death,
each of these resolutions has drawbacks, but there can be significant improvements
to many states’ current arbitrary systems.
I. DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEMES THAT PROVIDE FOR A
JURY ADVISORY RECOMMENDATION ARE A VIOLATION OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
The Sixth Amendment problems with judicial capital-sentencing decisions based
on incomplete information are addressed in Apprendi v. New Jersey34 and Ring v.
person, excessive cost of the death penalty, lack of closure or support provided to surviving
friends and family, and the increasing community opinion that the death penalty exceeds the
boundaries of human dignity. The arbitrary nature of the death penalty generally is not the focus
of this Article. However, this issue is important to note because the abolition of the death
penalty is a comprehensive and complete solution to the issues raised here.
30 DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 150 (1990)
(finding that black defendants who kill white victims have the greatest chance of being given
the death penalty). Controlling for variables, Baldus found that the odds of being executed
were 4.3 times greater for defendants who killed whites than for defendants who killed blacks.
Id. at 154; see also Race and the Death Penalty, ACLU (Feb. 26, 2003), http://www.aclu
.org/capital-punishment/race-and-death-penalty (indicating that as recently as 2003 the death
penalty has been discriminatorily applied).
31 See infra notes 241–47 and accompanying text; see also Public Opinion: 2012 Gallup
Poll Shows Support for Death Penalty Remains Near 40-Year Low, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/public-opinion-2012-gallup-poll-shows-support
-death-penalty-remains-near-40-year-low (last visited Apr. 15, 2014). This recent Gallup Poll
measured Americans’ abstract support for the death penalty at sixty-three percent. Id. As re-
cently as 1994, eighty percent of the respondents were in favor of the death penalty. Id. When
Gallup and other polls offer respondents a choice of life in prison without parole or the death
penalty, the public is nearly evenly split on the issue. Id. Conservatives, Republicans, men,
older respondents, and those with a high school education or less were most likely to support
the death penalty. Id. This poll was conducted December 19–22, 2012, and the margin of error
was +/- four percentage points. Id.
32 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
33 See, e.g., infra note 157 and accompanying text (describing a capital-sentencing scheme
requiring jury unanimity); infra note 158 and accompanying text (highlighting a scheme re-
quiring disclosure of all aggravators); infra Part VII (proposing a scheme that does not allow
for judicial override).
34 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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Arizona.35 Apprendi is a case with a majority opinion that reached two holdings.
First: Any fact, other than an element of a prior conviction, that increases the penalty
of a crime beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.36 Second: New Jersey’s hate crime statute, which allowed
a judge to increase the penalty beyond the maximum via a preponderance of the evi-
dence, violated the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.37 There were two
concurrences and two dissents, with the majority opinion authored by Justice Stevens
and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg. The State argued that the
judge’s actions involved a sentencing factor and not an “element of the offense”38 but
the Court did not find this persuasive. It was dismissed as a semantic disagreement
over how to apply a rule.39 If the defendant is exposed to a greater punishment than
authorized by a jury’s verdict, the judge may not increase the punishment unilaterally
or by a lesser standard: Otherwise, it violates the Sixth Amendment.40
In Ring v. Arizona, Ring and his friends robbed an armored car, killing the driver
in the process.41 Ring was convicted of felony murder by the jury.42 Subsequently,
a sentencing hearing was held without a jury and the judge found two aggravating
circumstances: that the crime was committed for pecuniary gain and that the crime
was committed “in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner” (also referred
to as heinous, atrocious or cruel, or “HAC”).43 The judge also found a single mitigat-
ing factor, which was Ring’s minimal criminal record.44 However, the judge did not
believe that this factor called for leniency and sentenced Ring to death.45 On appeal,
the Arizona Supreme Court agreed with Ring that the evidence was insufficient to
prove HAC, but re-weighed the remaining aggravating factor against the mitigation
and affirmed the death sentence.46 On review by the U.S. Supreme Court, this judg-
ment was reversed.47 Ring does not dispute, however, that the judge may re-weigh
the aggravators against the mitigators once an aggravator has been shown to be in-
valid and the Court has struck a particular aggravator, as the Arizona Supreme Court
did here.48
35 536 U.S. at 609.
36 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476, 490.
37 Id. at 476.
38 Id. at 472.
39 Id. at 475–76.
40 Id. at 476.
41 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 593–94 (2002).
42 Id. at 591.
43 Id. at 592–93 & n.1, 594–95.
44 Id. at 595.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 596.
47 Id. at 597.
48 See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990).
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The Ring Court dealt with the holdings they handed down in both Walton v.
Arizona49 and Apprendi, announcing them as “irreconcilable” under Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.50 The Court overruled Walton to the extent that it allowed a sentenc-
ing judge, without a jury, to find proven an aggravator necessary to impose the death
penalty. Ring reasoned that because Arizona’s aggravating factors act as an equiva-
lent to an element of a greater offense, then the Sixth Amendment requires the factors
be found by a jury.51 The reasoning was to prevent Apprendi from being reduced to
a nearly meaningless rule regarding statutory drafting:
Arizona . . . supports the distinction relied upon in Walton be-
tween elements of an offense and sentencing factors. As to ele-
vation of the maximum punishment, however, Apprendi renders
the argument untenable; Apprendi repeatedly instructs in that
context that the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an
“element” or a “sentencing factor” is not determinative of the
question “who decides,” judge or jury.52
Apprendi catalyzed the downfall of Walton, and Ring finished the job. The Court
concluded that “[c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, . . . are en-
titled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase
in their maximum punishment.”53 The rule, as it stands in this case, is expressed in the
portion of Apprendi quoted in Ring: “If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s
authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact—no matter how
the State labels it—must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”54
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Ring further clarifies the Court’s ruling. He stated
that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is
that all facts essential to the imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant
receives—“whether the statute calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors,
or Mary Jane—must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”55
Justice Scalia believes that the people’s belief in a right to trial by jury is in
“perilous decline.”56 He used evidence of state and federal legislatures adopting the
“sentencing factor” strategy to circumvent the jury requirement and leaving punish-
ment increases solely in the hands of judges.57 Scalia observed that the community’s
49 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (holding that it was acceptable under the Arizona sentencing
statutes for a judge, without a jury, to enhance a defendant’s sentence).
50 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 604–05 (citations omitted).
53 Id. at 589.
54 Id. at 602 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482–83 (2000)).
55 Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 612.
57 Id. at 611–12.
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adoration of the jury trial in criminal cases cannot be protected if courts become
“callous to the need for that protection by regularly imposing the death penalty with-
out it.”58
Thus, although Ring did not specifically hold that aggravators were elements of
the crime (as opposed to sentencing factors), it did hold that allowing the judge to en-
hance a sentence (in other words, impose a death sentence) based on an independent
finding of aggravators was a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.59
This is based on the fundamental tenet that the jury is the fact finder and the judge
determines the law. Aggravators are grounded in facts and must be proven with facts
by the prosecutors beyond a reasonable doubt.60 Some of the most serious and most
compelling aggravators to jurors are Cold Calculated and Premeditated (CCP), and
Heinous, Atrocious and Cruel (HAC).61 These aggravators can be proved only by
using factual evidence from the crime. For HAC the prosecution must convince the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim suffered unnecessarily, among other
facts.62 Therefore, evidence presented might include how long it took the victim to
die, or how much pain the victim was in and how long that pain lasted. For CCP, the
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a height-
ened level of planning and premeditation.63 Therefore, evidence presented might in-
clude previous threats made to the victim or prior purchases of weapons. Pursuant
to Ring, it is unconstitutional for the judge to make these factual findings.
II. HOW DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEMES
WITHSTAND A SIXTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Death-penalty schemes that fail to disclose the jury’s findings regarding aggrava-
tors and that provide for judicial overrides have survived repeated Sixth Amendment
challenges across the nation. To illustrate the manner in which courts have reached
such conclusions, Florida’s capital-sentencing scheme will be examined. Remarkably,
Florida’s death-penalty scheme has withstood Sixth Amendment scrutiny. This is
particularly troubling given that Florida’s death-penalty procedure gives the judge
some of the most discretion and least information of all of the schemes in the coun-
try, thereby resulting in the greatest potential for bias. In Florida, the jury provides
the judge a mere majority recommendation (not a unanimous vote) and an advisory
58 Id. at 612.
59 Id. at 609 (majority opinion).
60 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
61 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 87 So. 3d 667, 673, 677 (Fla. 2012) (discussing the great weight
afforded to HAC in this instance). See generally Ken Driggs, “The Most Aggravated and
Least Mitigated Murders”: Capital Proportionality Review in Florida, 11 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 207 (1999).
62 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655 (1990).
63 See Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 531 (1992).
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recommendation instead of a verdict.64 The jury is also not required to disclose which
aggravators they determined existed beyond a reasonable doubt.65 Thus, when the
judge enters a sentencing verdict, he does so not knowing if a particular aggravator
was even found (assuming there were at least two). Judge Jose Martinez of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of Florida in Evans v. McNeil66 found this
scheme unconstitutional as applied in Evans’s case,67 but the Eleventh Circuit over-
turned his decision in Evans v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections.68
In the district court, in which Evans had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus,
Evans contended that Florida’s death-penalty scheme, in which a jury recommends
a sentence of life imprisonment or death but the trial judge actually decides what sen-
tence to impose, is unconstitutional in light of Ring v. Arizona.69 Recall that Ring
held, under the Sixth Amendment, that a sentencing court cannot, over a defendant’s
objections, make factual findings with respect to aggravating circumstance neces-
sary for the imposition of the death penalty.70 Such findings must, as a constitutional
matter, be made by a jury.71 In Ring, the Supreme Court identified four states with
“hybrid” death penalty sentencing schemes similar to but not identical to Arizona’s.72
The “hybrid” states provide for advisory verdicts from juries but leave ultimate sentenc-
ing determinations to the judge.73 Those states are Florida, Alabama, Delaware, and
Indiana.74 Of those four states, two (Delaware and Indiana), require that juries make
unanimous findings regarding particular, specified aggravating factors.75 Alabama,
which presently requires at least ten jurors to recommend the death penalty, proposed
64 FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 22, ch. 7.11.
65 Id.
66 No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011).
67 Id. at *54.
68 Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
69 Evans v. McNeil, 2011 WL 9717450, at *5.
70 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 608 n.6.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2013) (“In order to find the existence of a statutory
aggravating circumstance . . . beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must be unanimous as to
the existence of that statutory aggravating circumstance. As to any statutory aggravating
circumstances . . . which were alleged but for which the jury is not unanimous, the jury shall
report the number of the affirmative and negative votes on each such circumstance. . . . [T]he
Court shall discharge that jury after it has reported its findings and recommendation . . . .”
(emphasis added)); IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9 (2013) (“The court shall instruct the jury that, in
order for the jury to recommend to the court that the death penalty or life imprisonment with-
out parole should be imposed, the jury must find at least one (1) aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt . . . and shall provide a special verdict form for each aggravating
circumstance alleged.”).
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legislation pending that would commit the sentencing decision entirely to the jury.76
Florida law, which requires a mere majority for a death-penalty recommendation
and does not require special verdict forms to record specific findings by the jury, is
an outlier.77
Evans was a 1991 murder-for-hire case. The case involved a conspiracy between
four people: Sarah Thomas (Evans’s girlfriend), Donna Waddell (Evans’s roommate),
Connie Pfeiffer (the victim’s wife), and Evans.78 At trial the evidence established,
primarily through the testimony of Sarah and Donna, that Connie wanted to kill her
husband Alan for his insurance money.79 Sarah testified that Evans said he would
kill Alan in exchange for a stereo, some of the insurance money, and a camcorder.80
Sarah further testified that the four of them conspired to come up with a plan to kill
Alan without getting caught. The plan was that they would go to the fair and stay
long enough to be seen.81 Donna and Sarah then took Evans back to the trailer where
Evans staged a robbery.82 Donna and Sarah went back to the fair, leaving Evans in the
trailer to wait for Alan’s return to kill him.83 Evans shot Alan when Alan entered the
trailer.84 Evans left with the electronics and the trailer in “disarray.”85 The police found
no signs of forced entry and the back door open.86 They also found Alan’s life insur-
ance policy papers on the table for $120,000 with Donna named as the beneficiary.87
The case became inactive until 1997 when the case was reopened and Sarah and
Donna agreed to cooperate.88 Based on their cooperation, Connie and Evans were
arrested for murder.89 
On February 11, 1999, a jury found Evans guilty of first-degree murder.90 The
same jury recommended the death penalty for Evans by a vote of nine to three.91 Evans
was subsequently sentenced to death by the Florida trial judge on June 16 of that
year.92 The Supreme Court of Florida summed up the judge’s findings as follows:
76 See S. 247, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2011). This bill did not pass.
77 See infra Part V.A.
78 Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. 2001).
79 Id. at 95–96.
80 Id. at 96.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 96–97.
85 Id. at 97.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 98.
89 Id.
90 See Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. 699 F.3d
1249 (11th Cir. 2012).
91 Id.
92 Id.
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The trial court found the following in aggravation: (1) Evans
had committed the crime for pecuniary gain (great weight); and
(2) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and premed-
itated manner without any pretense of legal or moral justification
(“CCP”) (great weight). The court found only one statutory miti-
gator: Evans’ [sic] age of nineteen when he committed the murder
(little weight).
In addition, the trial court found and gave weight to the fol-
lowing nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Evans’ [sic] good conduct
while in jail (little weight); (2) Evans’ [sic] good attitude and con-
duct while awaiting trial (little weight); (3) Evans had a difficult
childhood (little weight); (4) Evans was raised without a father
(little weight); (5) Evans was the product of a broken home (little
weight); (6) Evans suffered great trauma during childhood (mod-
erate weight); (7) Evans suffered from hyperactivity and had a
prior psychiatric history and a history of hospitalization for mental
illness (moderate weight); (8) Evans was the father of two young
girls (very little weight); (9) Evans believes in God (very little
weight); (10) Evans will adjust well to life in prison and is un-
likely to be a danger to others while serving a life sentence (very
little weight); (11) Evans loves his family and Evans’ [sic] family
loves him (very little weight). The trial court found that Evans
failed to establish that he was immature, and therefore gave this
proposed mitigator no weight. Moreover, the court refused to rec-
ognize Evans’ [sic] [evident] artistic ability as a mitigating cir-
cumstance and therefore gave this no weight. Concluding that the
aggravation outweighed the mitigation, the trial court imposed the
death penalty.93
In Florida, the jury instructions (1) provide for a majority only vote (nonunan-
imous); (2) provide the judge with an advisory opinion that the judge may override;
and (3) do not require the jury to disclose which aggravators it found to be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.94 In Florida, the judge must give the jury recommendation
“great weight.”95 Further, the sentencing judge cannot override a jury recommendation
of life imprisonment if the jury had a “reasonable basis” for the recommendation.96
It is inexplicable how the sentencing judge knows if the jury has a reasonable basis for
its recommendation when she is not communicated the basis. It is noteworthy that
93 Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d at 99–100.
94 See FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 22, ch. 7.11. See generally FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010).
95 See Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975).
96 See Hall v. State, 541 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1989).
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all but one aggravator must be determined by the jury. Courts do not contemplate that
the aggravator “prior conviction of an aggravated violent felony” must be determined
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.97 This is not a fact that juries are in an adequate
position to determine. Juries are not well versed or familiar with court documents that
list individuals’ criminal records and how these documents are obtained. The defen-
dants’ attorneys are in a better position to analyze these documents and make any
arguments that may be proper, and the judge is in the better position to determine if
such arguments are supported. This aggravator is an anomaly. Other statutory aggra-
vators are based on witness evidence, and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt
by the prosecution and will involve an assessment of credibility and sensibility by
the jury (for example, HAC or Vulnerable Victim).
In Evans, the trial judge made his own separate factual findings.98 Without a spe-
cial verdict form that informs that judge of which of the aggravators the jury found
proven, it is possible that the trial judge found the existence of one aggravating factor
while the jury found the existence of another, resulting in a sentence of death for a
defendant based on an invalid aggravator, in other words, an aggravator not found
by the jury. This fact cannot be reconciled with Ring. Further, nothing in the record
shows that the Evans jury found the existence of a single aggravating factor by even
a simple majority.99 The jury was presented with two aggravating factors for consid-
eration,100 and it is possible that the nine jurors who voted for death reached their de-
termination by having four jurors find one aggravator while five jurors found another.
Either of these results would have the aggravator found by less than a majority of the
jurors. Although the court noted that unanimity may not be required, it cannot be that
Evans’s death sentence is constitutional when there is no evidence to suggest that even
a simple majority found the existence of any single aggravating circumstance.101 There
may have been no one aggravating factor found by a majority of the jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. This is also true for any state where the jury provides a recommenda-
tion as opposed to a verdict and does not reveal the aggravators upon which they relied.
The Eleventh Circuit’s interpretation of Ring in Evans’s habeas proceeding is such
that, at the very minimum, the defendant is entitled to a jury’s majority fact finding
of the existence of an aggravating factor; not simply a majority of jurors finding the
existence of any unspecified combination of aggravating factors upon which the judge
may or may not base the death sentence.102 Because the jury may not have reached
a majority finding as to any one aggravating factor, the Florida sentencing statute
leaves open the very real possibility that in substance the judge still makes the factual
97 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 246 (1998).
98 See Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d at 107–09.
99 See generally Evans v. State, 808 So. 2d 92.
100 Id. at 99.
101 Id. at 109.
102 Evans v. Sec’y, Fla Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1260–62 (11th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
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findings necessary for the imposition of the death penalty as opposed to the jury as
required by Ring. The district court in determining Evans’s habeas petition found that
the process completed before the imposition of the death penalty is in violation of
Ring in that the jury’s recommendation is not a factual finding sufficient to satisfy the
Sixth Amendment; rather, it is simply a sentencing recommendation made without
a clear factual finding. As the district court stated, “in effect, the only meaningful
findings regarding aggravating factors are made by the judge.”103 Therefore, Judge
Martinez granted Habeas relief on these grounds.104
Prior to Evans, in State v. Steele105 the Florida Supreme Court addressed the Ring
holding but expressly stated that the court is not deciding whether Ring applies to the
Florida system.106 Steele does however discuss whether Ring requires Florida to use
a specialized verdict form which discloses the jury’s findings of particular aggravators.
Steele strongly suggests that a unanimous jury verdict may well be within the scope
of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for Florida.107 Steele ultimately concluded that,
because Florida’s scheme requires the jury to determine the existence of at least one
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before recommending death,
no disclosure is needed and there are no constitutional issues.108 Steele also held that
the jury’s majority does not have to agree on the existence of the same aggravating
circumstance but only a majority must agree that one of them was in fact proven.109
The Eleventh Circuit in Evans v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections,110
with Judge Carnes writing for the majority, overturned Judge Martinez’s ruling regard-
ing Florida’s death-penalty scheme.111 In sum, the court held that, because the sen-
tencing judge does know that the jury found at least one aggravator to be proven by
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily comports with Ring and the Sixth
Amendment.112 The court cited Ault v. State,113 noting that “a jury cannot advise in
favor of death unless it finds the existence of at least one statutory aggravating cir-
cumstance” to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.114 Judge Carnes also placed
emphasis on the Florida rule that the judge must give the jury’s recommendation
103 Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *53 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d
1249 (11th Cir. 2012).
104 Id. at *54.
105 921 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 2005).
106 Id. at 545–46.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 546.
110 Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
111 Id. at 1265.
112 Id. at 1250, 1253, 1255–56, 1260.
113 Ault v. State, 53 So. 3d 175, 200 (Fla. 2010).
114 Evans v. Sec’y, 699 F.3d at 1256 (citing Ault, 53 So. 3d at 205).
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“great weight.”115 The court went to great effort to underscore that the sentencing
judge’s findings must be in writing and specify each aggravator and mitigator the
judge found to exist, as well as the weight the judge allocated to the factor. The court
stressed that the Florida Supreme Court cannot sustain an opinion of a trial judge
unless the record reflects substantial competent evidence to support the trial judge’s
weighing process.116 Evans v. Secretary used Proffitt v. Florida117 to find that Florida’s
sentencing scheme is anything but arbitrary, in part because it is “judge-based.”118
This 1976 case goes as far as to state:
[I]t would appear that judicial sentencing should lead, if anything,
to even greater consistency in the imposition at the trial court level
of capital punishment, since a trial judge is more experienced in
sentencing than a jury, and therefore is better able to impose sen-
tences similar to those imposed in analogous cases.119
Proffitt and indeed Evans v. Secretary missed the mark. An argument that pro-
tections are in place to insure that the judge’s decisionmaking is fair in capital sentenc-
ing is contradictory to what the law requires.120 Apprendi and Ring compel the jury,
and only the jury, to make any factual finding that increases a defendant’s sentence.
The judge’s hands are tied in this regard. He is prohibited from ascertaining the facts,
or speculating as to what facts the jury found. The notion that a judge should be con-
sistent, from case to case, is counter-intuitive with the fundamental tenet of death-
penalty jurisprudence that each case should be decided on an individual basis.121
Procedures should be consistent but the judge’s application of those procedures must
be individualized for each unique defendant. Judges are instructed to sentence each
capital defendant on an individual basis.122 Whether an individual morally deserves
to live or die as determined by the applicable mitigators and aggravators is a highly
individualized decision. Each case necessarily differs because death-penalty sentenc-
ing hearings involve the close examination of the character, personality, and value of
the defendant holistically. Each death-penalty sentencing is as different as each person
is to another. To create the need for capital-sentencing consistency is paramount to
115 Id. (citing Tedder v. State, 322 So. 2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975)).
116 Id. (citing Oyola v. State, 99 So. 3d 431, 446 (Fla. 2012)).
117 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
118 Evans v. Sec’y, 699 F.3d at 1257 (citing Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252–53).
119 Proffitt, 428 U.S. at 252.
120 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607–08 (2001) (“In any event, the superiority of
judicial fact finding in capital cases is far from evident. Unlike Arizona, the great majority
of States responded to this Court’s Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of
aggravating circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the jury.”).
121 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978).
122 See, e.g., id.
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saying all lawyers are alike or anyone that works at a bank is the same. It is not just
or reasonable to make attempts at consistency when sentencing a person to life or
death. One defendant’s crime that was particularly heinous, but was committed by
a person with brain damage, might legally require a life sentence, where another with
the same aggravators and mitigators may not. These decisions fundamentally rely on
the jury’s assessment of the value of the defendant as a person and the weight of the ag-
gravators, if proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases like Tuilaepa v. California123
and Jones v. United States,124 the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that each death-
penalty case must be given individualized review and that the State is entrusted with
the task of ensuring that the process be principled and neutral.125 Although judges
are understood to be neutral, in circumstances such as these, judges are unable to be
neutral because they are prohibited from knowing the evidence, knowing the findings,
or knowing the facts. Evans v. Secretary also cited Hildwin v. Florida,126 which stated
that the judge does not need to know specific facts from the jury to determine that
sufficient aggravating circumstances apply.127 Again, this case is pre-Apprendi and
Ring and is contrary to their holdings. Further, neither Ring nor any other case has put
any restraints on the jury’s power to place as much or little weight on any mitigators
as they see fit. Perplexingly, the Evans court cited Spaziano v. Florida128 in support
of its position that Florida’s sentencing scheme is constitutional in the face of new
law holding that the jury must make all factual decisions regarding aggravators.129
Spaziano held:
There is no . . . danger [of an erroneously imposed death penalty]
involved in denying a defendant a jury trial on the sentencing
issue of life or death. The sentencer, whether judge or jury, has
a constitutional obligation to evaluate the unique circumstances
of the individual defendant and the sentencer’s decision for life
is final. More important, despite its unique aspects, a capital sen-
tencing proceeding involves the same fundamental issue involved
in any other sentencing proceeding—a determination of the ap-
propriate punishment to be imposed on an individual. The Sixth
Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury
determination of that issue.130
123 512 U.S. 967 (1994).
124 527 U.S. 373 (1999).
125 See id. at 381; Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973.
126 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (per curiam).
127 Id. at 640–41.
128 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
129 Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013) (citing Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459).
130 Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459 (citations omitted).
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Although neither Ring nor Apprendi disputed that the judge may determine the
ultimate punishment for a defendant as Spaziano holds, Spaziano specifically disre-
garded that the judge as sentencer may only base his sentence on jury-determined
facts. Spaziano is a direct contradiction of today’s law. Thus, Evans v. Secretary is
an example of the court’s dodging of the question. The Supreme Court has held on
numerous occasions, as in Jefferson County v. Acker,131 that “[i]f a precedent of [the
Supreme] Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected
in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to [the Supreme] Court, the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions.”132 Therefore, Evans v. Secretary chose to let the Supreme Court handle
this issue if it so desired. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and
elected to let this injustice persist.133
III. 2013: ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES:
CAPITAL SENTENCING JURY FACT-FINDING CLARIFIED
In 2013, Alleyne v. United States134 further clarified Apprendi v. New Jersey.
Alleyne held that if a fact constitutes an element or ingredient of a charged offense,
the jury must have found it beyond a reasonable doubt.135 It further explained that any-
thing that increases a punishment in any way is, by rule, a fact.136 Alleyne broadened
the rule from both Ring and Apprendi in that it held not only that a judge cannot en-
hance a defendant’s sentence above the statutory maximum, but also that she cannot
raise the ceiling either, even if the sentence remains within the statutory range.137 In
Alleyne, the jury found that the defendant had “used or carried a firearm in relation
to a crime of violence.”138 This crime carried a minimum sentence of five years.139
However, the statute allowed the minimum to be increased to seven years if the weapon
was brandished.140 The jury did not find that the weapon was “brandished.”141 The
judge disagreed with the jury’s factual finding, made his own factual finding, and in-
creased the minimum sentence to seven years.142 Alleyne objected but was defeated
on appeal to the Fourth Circuit.143 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the judge did not
131 210 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2000).
132 Evans v. Sec’y, 699 F.3d at 1263 (citing Acker, 210 F.3d at 1320).
133 Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
134 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
135 Id. at 2163.
136 Id. at 2155.
137 Id. at 2162–63.
138 Id. at 2156.
139 Id. at 2155.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 2156.
142 Id. at 2164–65.
143 Id. at 2156.
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have this authority because the fact of brandishing the weapon increased Alleyne’s
punishment, and as a result, that fact has to be determined by the jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.144 Further, this case clarified that any fact that enhances a defendant’s
punishment is considered an element of the crime (as opposed to a sentencing factor).145
It is difficult to dispute that facts increasing the legally prescribed minimum sen-
tence may also increase the punishment, heightening the loss of liberty associated
with the crime. The fact of brandishing the weapon had to be determined by the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt before the statutory minimum could be raised. Therefore,
Alleyne solidified the finding that the judge cannot make factual determinations that
increase a defendant’s sentence; these factual determinations must be founded in evi-
dentiary determinations made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. It is hard to
fathom that the Eleventh Circuit could have overruled Evans if Alleyne had existed
at the time. However, the Sixth Amendment subject addressed in Ring, Apprendi,
Evans, and Alleyne is not likely over. There has been considerable dispute regarding
the matter even among the Supreme Court itself. The Alleyne decision was a hotly dis-
puted decision and was a split decision, five votes to four.146 Although, the Florida
scheme has survived a Sixth Amendment analysis so far, its scheme and other similar
schemes would not likely survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny. These schemes are
arbitrary as defined in Furman v. Georgia.147
IV. JURY ADVISORY RECOMMENDATIONS VIOLATE THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT’S BAN ON ARBITRARY PUNISHMENT
Death-penalty sentencing procedures that allow the judge to override the jury’s
decision and that do not require the jury to disclose which aggravators they determined
to be proven are unconstitutional. These capital-sentencing schemes are problematic
because they violate the Sixth Amendment pursuant to Ring and its progeny. Resulting
from the Sixth Amendment mandate against judicial fact finding, an Eighth Amend-
ment concern arose. When a judge overrides a jury recommendation, because the
judge may not assess the facts without running afoul of the Sixth Amendment, the
judge has no other route to travel in which to make a decision other than speculation
and supposition. The result is arbitrary death sentencing in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. Today, a minimum of one-third of the states that maintain the death
penalty have arbitrary capital-sentencing schemes that possess the grave potential
for producing haphazard or indiscriminate death sentences in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.148 Arbitrary death sentencing was first held to be a violation of the
144 Id. at 2163–64.
145 Id. at 2158.
146 See id. at 2154–55.
147 See infra Part IV.
148 Thirty-two states maintain the death penalty and at least eleven have arbitrary proce-
dures. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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Eighth Amendment in Furman v. Georgia.149 Furman centered its opinion upon the
proscription of cruel and unusual punishments and stated that the Eighth Amend-
ment “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”150
Furman was the first case to coin the phrase “arbitrary and capricious” in the
Eighth Amendment context and held that “[a] penalty . . . should be considered
‘unusually’ imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.”151 Furman
is a long opinion, consisting of five concurring opinions and four dissenting opinions.
Three of the four dissenting opinions are joined by the other three dissenters, who also
wrote their own opinions.152 The per curiam opinion is about a paragraph long and
held that the imposition of the death penalty in the cases reviewed fit the definition
of “cruel and unusual punishment” and reversed the judgment, remanding for further
proceedings.153 In essence, Furman found that because the states had not adopted spe-
cific sentencing procedures and guidelines for death-penalty cases, these states had
imposed arbitrary death sentences. The opinion served as a de facto ban on the death
penalty: “[T]here is increasing recognition of the fact that the basic theme of equal
protection is implicit in ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments. ‘A penalty . . . should be con-
sidered “unusually” imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or discriminatorily.’”154
Furman recognized that human bias and social attitudes necessarily influence
judges and juries. Furman reviewed a number of studies and found that individual
dispositions of judges and juries resulted in the disproportionate imposition of death
on “the poor, the Negro, and the members of unpopular groups.”155 Subsequently,
many states’ legislatures drafted specific procedures to be followed before the imposi-
tion of the death penalty.156 These schemes led to the reinstatement of the death pen-
alty in many jurisdictions on the premise that specific jury instructions with structure
and guidelines would prevent bias and discrimination in death-penalty sentencing.
An example of one of the most structurally sound procedures for determining life
or death for a defendant is (ironically) in Georgia. In Georgia, the jury is instructed in
their jury instructions that their decision regarding the sentence of life or death “must
be unanimous, and it must be in writing, dated, signed by [their] foreperson and re-
turned and read in open court.”157 Further, the Georgia jury instructions advise that
149 408 U.S. 238, 249 (1972).
150 Id. at 270 n.10 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910)).
151 Id. at 249 (quoting Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death
Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1790 (1970)).
152 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
153 Id. at 239–40.
154 Id. at 249 (citations omitted).
155 Id. at 249–50.
156 For an example of how one state changed its procedures after Furman, see Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 196–208 (1976) (upholding Georgia’s post-Furman death-penalty
regime).
157 GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 2.15.80 (4th ed. 2013).
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the jury must “set out in writing such aggravating circumstance(s) that [they] may
find from the evidence in this case to exist beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .”158 An
aggravating circumstance is a circumstance that the state must prove through facts
to the jury that increases the moral culpability of the defendant for the crime.159 Most
jurisdictions define an aggravating circumstance as a standard to guide the jury in
making the choice between the alternative recommendations of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole or death. It is a statutorily enumerated circumstance
which increases the gravity of a crime or the harm to a victim.160 Georgia’s capital-
sentencing procedures do an adequate job informing the judge of the factual findings
of the jury.
Nonetheless, today, just as in 1972 when Furman was decided, the death penalty
is discriminatorily applied. In 1983, over a decade after Furman, a group of research-
ers performed a study to assess potential bias in the Georgia death-penalty system.
This study has come to be known as the Baldus study.161 Its findings were unmistak-
able, in that death sentences were being given in a highly prejudiced manner. The study
found that black defendants who kill white victims have a much greater chance of
being given the death penalty than do white defendants that kill black victims with
generally equal mitigators and aggravators.162 Further, more than twenty independent
studies around the nation, as recently as 2008, have reached similar conclusions.163
These studies include states that disclose the aggravators to the judge and states that
do not, like Florida. Baldus found that the odds of being executed were 4.3 times
greater for defendants who killed whites than for defendants who killed blacks.164 The
results of the Baldus study did not lead to improvements in capital-sentencing struc-
tures or the controlling of personal bias in death-penalty proceedings. From 1976 to
2003, people of color have accounted for a disproportionate forty-three percent of the
total executions in the United States.165 While white victims account for nearly half
of all murder victims, a whopping eighty percent of all death-penalty cases involve
158 GEORGIA SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, § 2.15.62 (4th ed. 2013).
159 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
160 See, e.g., supra note 22 and accompanying text.
161 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 30.
162 Id.
163 See Adam Liptak, A New Look at Death Sentences and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29,
2008, at A10.
164 See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 30, at 154. The Baldus study also found that (1) defen-
dants who kill white victims receive the death penalty in eighteen percent of cases; (2) defendants
who kill black victims receive the death penalty in ten percent of cases; (3) the death penalty
was given in thirty-one percent of cases of a black defendant and a white victim; (4) the death
penalty was given in eight percent of cases of a white defendant and a white victim; (5) the
death penalty was given in ten percent of cases of a black defendant and a black victim; and
(6) the death penalty was given in ten percent of cases of a white defendant and a black victim.
Id. at 141.
165 Race and the Death Penalty, supra note 30.
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white victims.166 Additionally, as of 2002, a grand total of twelve people were executed
in cases where the defendant was white and the victim black.167 Conversely and dis-
turbingly, 178 black defendants have been executed for the murder of white victims.168
Why is this discrepancy still occurring? Preconceptions, prejudices, and biases
are often learned very early and are incorporated both consciously and unconsciously
into a person’s behavior. Unconscious bias and prejudice are the most dangerous types
of error because they are outside the person’s awareness and therefore not available
for attempts at conscious control and modification. Similarly, when confronted with
the termination of a human’s life, each individual is prone, at least in part, to react
in a highly personal and sometimes biased manner. Statutes that fail to provide the
sentencing judge with which aggravators the jury found proven beyond a reasonable
doubt lead to arbitrary judicial decisionmaking because they result in a context which
can promote the expression of the judges conscious or unconscious prejudice in her
sentencing decision. This brand of arbitrary judicial decisionmaking provides a fertile
ground for capital judicial sentencing to reflect personal bias and may account for many
of the results seen in the Baldus study and studies of its kind. A lack of parameters
and specific guidelines for the judge leaves room for prejudicial decisionmaking.
Prejudice is defined as a sentiment that lacks adequate factual information to support
a conclusion; an uninformed decision based on personal preconceptions.169
An uninformed decision is arbitrary. What does the judge rely on when making
a capital-sentencing decision when she must make the decision without the necessary
and sufficient information to do so? In a capital sentencing, the judge is prohibited
from weighing the facts in order to determine the existence of aggravators, thus the
judge cannot rely on the facts from the sentencing hearing to make her decision. The
judge is forced into a speculative endeavor to guess which aggravators the jury found
to be proven. As a result, judges are left with wide discretion to decide if the defendant
lives or dies.
Too much judicial discretion provides occasion for potential prejudice and bias.
This risk of bias is enhanced when the judge’s sentencing decision does not contain
the safeguards that are provided by jury decisions. The Sixth Amendment intends
to provide defendants with a degree of fairness because it is less probable that one
person’s prejudice or bias will dictate a jury’s decision. A one-person decision leaves
no room for other individuals to provide guidance, balance, and alternative view-
points. Two individuals may hear the same information and interpret it differently.170
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 “Prejudice” is defined from many sources as an opinion or decision made without
sufficient knowledge or factual basis. See, e.g., Prejudice Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER
ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/prejudice (last visited
Apr. 15, 2014); see also Prejudice Definition, FREE DICTIONARY, http://www.thefreedictionary
.com/prejudice (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
170 ZIMBARDO & LEIPPE, supra note 13, at 291–92.
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For example, the term “often” may mean something very different to different lis-
teners.171 Therefore, group decisions provide a level of fairness and objectivity.
Although death-penalty schemes where aggravators remain unrevealed and where
judges make the final sentencing decisions have so far survived a Sixth Amendment
analysis, they are unlikely to survive an Eighth Amendment analysis. Picture this: A
jury is presented with only three aggravators; even in a unanimous vote jurisdiction,
four jurors may agree on one aggravator and reject the other two, another four jurors
may agree on only one different aggravator and the last four on another, resulting
in only four votes for each aggravator, but a unanimous jury verdict for death. This
occurs because jury instructions do not inform juries that they must all agree that the
same aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but that they simply must
unanimously agree that at least one aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt
and that the aggravator(s) outweigh the mitigators.
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia,172 the Supreme Court held that proper guidelines
for the judge could ensure that the death penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary or
capricious manner.173 However, in Gregg, the Court mandated that the sentencing
judge must be given adequate information and guidance so that the sentence would
not be arbitrary or capricious.174 It further required that the judge be apprised of the
information relevant to the imposition of sentence. At a minimum, Gregg construed
Furman as holding that “where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter
so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that
discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.”175
Pursuant to Gregg and in conjunction with Ring, a state where the jury does not
divulge which aggravators it found beyond a reasonable doubt cannot pass Eighth
Amendment scrutiny. Gregg considers a sentence arbitrary if a judge does not have
the relevant information needed to decide whether she should impose life or death.176
Which aggravators the jury determined existed beyond a reasonable doubt is precisely
171 To demonstrate individual interpretation of written or spoken material, one study used
the term “often” as a part of a question asking how often a subject did something. The listeners
translated the term “often” into the following percentages: weekly or more often (forty-one
percent), once or twice a month (thirty-three percent), and less than once a month (twenty-six
percent). The term “often” is a verbal construct and in the absence of very specific and concrete
denotation may result in an unexpected range of responses that essentially render meaningless
and unhelpful the construct “often.” See LEE J. CRONBACH, ESSENTIALS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTING 515–16 (5th ed. 1990); C. Robert Pace & Jack Friedlander, The Meaning of Response
Categories: How Often Is “Occasionally,” “Often,” and “Very Often”?, 17 RES. IN HIGHER
EDUC. 3, 267–81 (1982).
172 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
173 Id. at 195.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 189.
176 Id. at 194–95.
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the information the judge requires to make an informed sentencing decision or else
the decision is arbitrary. This problem is demonstrated when the judge maintains
sentencing authority in death cases.
To further illustrate, assume the judge is a robot, therefore lacking any human
capacity for prejudice or bias. The robot judge is presented with a capital-sentencing
decision under a scheme similar to Florida’s, where the judge is uninformed as to
which aggravators the jury found proven. The robot judge would follow the law pre-
cisely and under Ring, Apprendi, and Alleyne, it would refrain from an evaluation of
the facts in which to ascertain which aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Faced with the task of weighing the aggravators against the mitigators in order
to determine the appropriate sentence, the robot judge would be unable to render a
sentence. The robot judge would lack sufficient information to calculate a sentence.
Such an analogy makes clear that under such a capital-sentencing scheme, a judge
necessarily must assess the facts in violation of the Sixth Amendment or rely on her
personal value system and innate biases. A robot judge would not compute a sentence
and likely self-destruct due to cognitive dissonance. A human judge must choose be-
tween violating the law or using personal feelings and prejudice. The result is an un-
informed and arbitrary decision in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
If a jurisdiction does not require the exposure of aggravators, and also only re-
quires a mere majority vote, then even a specific jury form indicating which aggra-
vators the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt would not cure the problem. This
is because the jury form does not assure the judge that the aggravators were agreed
upon by a majority of the jury. The district court in Evans on habeas review discussed
that with a jury vote for death of nine to three, when two aggravators were presented
to the jury for consideration, five jurors could have been convinced as to one aggrava-
tor and four jurors could have been convinced as to the other.177 A specialized verdict
form disclosing which aggravators the jury found existed beyond a reasonable doubt
does not cure this problem. If the jury form only indicated that both aggravators were
found then the judge would be affirmatively misled into the false assumption that
a majority of the jury found both aggravators to be proven.
This holds true if even the jurisdiction requires a unanimous jury vote. Even with
a unanimous vote for death the jury may not have even agreed by a majority vote that
even one aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In a jurisdiction that
requires a unanimous jury verdict, if the jury is presented with three aggravators, four
jurors could find one, four could find another, and four could find a third, thereby
reaching a unanimous jury verdict that the aggravators outweigh the mitigators. The
jury verdict form may simply say that three aggravators were found and again the
judge is misled. In both of these examples, an individual is likely to be sentenced to
death when not one aggravator was agreed upon by a majority in one case or unani-
mously in another. To be clear, these are circumstances where the judge is guessing
177 Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450, at *54 (S.D. Fla. June 20,
2011).
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and speculating that the jury did in fact find the aggravators proven by a majority vote
or unanimously. How many individuals have been executed under these circumstances?
The judge may know that the jury determined the existence of one aggravating
circumstance if they recommended death. Yet this is not meaningful unless there was
only one aggravating circumstance presented to the jury in the first place. If two or
more aggravating circumstances were presented to the jury, then the jury may have
rejected one or more and the judge has no way of knowing this. Thus, it is impossible
for the judge to base her decision on the jury’s decision because the jury’s decision
remains a mystery.
In states with a judicial override, like Florida, the judge may even impose a death
sentence when the jury has recommended life. The Florida death-penalty statute
empowers the court to enter a sentence of life or death notwithstanding the jury’s
recommendation.178 The court must base this decision on the existence of sufficient
aggravating circumstances and insufficient mitigating circumstances. As discussed,
the judge does not know which aggravating circumstances exist, if any. This occurred
in Spaziano v. State.179 In this circumstance, in a state that does not reveal any of the
jury’s findings, the court will not know whether the jury found that no aggravators
exist or whether the jury found that aggravators did exist but the mitigators outweighed
them. In the first instance, if a judge sentenced a defendant to die, this would clearly
violate both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments as the judge would have to assume that
the jury did find aggravators and also assume she knew what the aggravators were.
Then the judge would be re-weighing them and reaching a different result. Again, the
process devolves into a form of judicial mysticism.
If juries do not disclose their decisions regarding aggravators, it would be just as
likely that a jury rejected one or more aggravators entirely, yet the judge may presume
178 Findings in Support of Sentence of Death—Notwithstanding the rec-
ommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, shall enter a sentence of life
imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of death, it
shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death
is based as to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in
subsection (5), and
(b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the
aggravating circumstances.
In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the deter-
mination of the court shall be supported by specific written findings of
fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) and upon
the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. If the court does
not make the findings requiring the death sentence within 30 days after
the rendition of the judgment and sentence, the court shall impose
sentence of life imprisonment . . . .
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2010) (emphasis added).
179 393 So. 2d 1119 (Fla. 1981).
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that the jury rested their decision on that aggravator. In jurisdictions where the judge
imposes the sentence, she is charged with sentencing the defendant pursuant to the
jury’s recommendation, presumably without redetermining the facts already estab-
lished by the jury. As is abundantly clear, the jury must decide the facts, so when the
judge is sentencing she should not reassess the facts. In spite of this, judges in many
states do just that.
V. SPECIFIC STATES’ CAPITAL-SENTENCING SCHEMES THAT
VIOLATE THE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENTS
One-third of the states’ capital-sentencing schemes are arbitrary and in violation
of the Eighth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment. In Georgia, as in the majority
of death-penalty jurisdictions, the penalty phase in which the jury renders a sentenc-
ing verdict is bifurcated from the guilt phase. In other words, most jurisdictions, state
and federal, have death-penalty trials in two phases, phase I, in which the jury deter-
mines whether or not the prosecution has proven the defendant’s guilt, and if the
defendant is found guilty, phase II, in which the same jury determines by verdict or
advisory recommendation if the defendant should be sentenced to death or life with-
out parole. Other than some general issues that will be discussed in the solutions and
conclusions section, Georgia’s death-penalty scheme and others like it reflect a scheme
that comes close to providing proper guidance for the courts and meeting constitu-
tional requirements.180 Georgia’s procedures come close to meeting constitutional
requirements because:
(1) The jury renders a verdict, not merely an advisory opinion or recom-
mendation;
(2) Their vote must be unanimous as to the aggravators proven beyond a
reasonable doubt and to their verdict of death; and
(3) They must disclose to the judge in the verdict form which aggravators the
jury determined were proven beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence.181
However, many other states’ procedures encompass several problems with their
death-penalty schemes. For example, in Alabama and Florida, among others, the jury
does not render a verdict as to life or death but only an advisory recommendation to
the judge.182 Further, in many states, the jury does not disclose to the judge the aggra-
vating circumstances upon which it relied in finding for death. Consequently, in these
jurisdictions, judges sentence defendants to death while remaining uninformed of
the specific jury findings. In these circumstances, judges are left without the proper
guidance to render a constitutional verdict. The law requires that the jury make all fac-
tual findings.183 Thus, if the judge is charged with rendering the verdict blind to these
180 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30 (West 2013).
181 See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
182 See infra text accompanying notes 186, 199.
183 Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2154–63 (2013); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584, 608 n.6 (2002); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
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factual findings, such verdict is necessarily arbitrary. These states’ schemes are arbi-
trary and in obvious violation of the Eighth Amendment.
A number of states’ capital-sentencing statutes require that the jury merely recom-
mend a sentence to the judge and then the judge makes the final life or death determi-
nation. These states include Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Montana, and Nebraska.184
In addition, a number of states do not require juries to divulge which aggravators
they determined to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. These states include California,
Florida, Montana, Utah, and Virginia.185 If a judge determines a death sentence wholly
unaware of the jury’s factual findings regarding the aggravators, then such a decision
meets the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against arbitrary punishment. In a majority-
vote jurisdiction like Florida, the jury could provide a recommendation for death while
outright rejecting one or more aggravators with the judge never knowing. This is a
clear example of arbitrary sentencing on the part of both the judge and the jury.
A. Florida
The following example of the Florida jury instructions indicates that the fact
finding power is left to the judge:
If, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances,
you determine that at least one aggravating circumstance is found
to exist and that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh
the aggravating circumstances, or, in the absence of mitigating
factors, that the aggravating factors alone are sufficient, you may
recommend that a sentence of death be imposed rather than a sen-
tence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Regardless
of your findings in this respect, however, you are neither com-
pelled nor required to recommend a sentence of death. If, on the
other hand, you determine that no aggravating circumstances are
found to exist, or that the mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, or, in the absence of mitigating fac-
tors, that the aggravating factors alone are not sufficient, you must
recommend imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole rather than a sentence of death. The process
of weighing aggravating and mitigating factors to determine the
proper punishment is not a mechanical process. The law contem-
plates that different factors may be given different weight or values
by different jurors. In your decision-making process, you, and you
184 See Robbie Brown, In Georgia, Push to End Unanimity for Execution, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/17/us/17death.html?_r=1&.
185 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207(1)(a) (West 2013); VA. PRACTICE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, § 79:4 (2013).
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alone, are to decide what weight is to be given to a particular
factor. In these proceedings, it is not necessary that the advisory
sentence of the jury be unanimous. The fact that the jury can rec-
ommend a sentence of life imprisonment or death in this case on
a single ballot should not influence you to act hastily or without
due regard to the gravity of these proceedings. Before you ballot
you should carefully weigh, sift, and consider the evidence, realiz-
ing that human life is at stake, and bring your best judgment to
bear in reaching your advisory sentence. If a majority of the jury,
seven or more, determine that (defendant) should be sentenced
to death, your advisory sentence will be . . . .186
In these jury instructions, it is not indicated that the majority of jurors must agree
that the same aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It merely states that
a majority of the jurors must agree to advise the judge that the defendant should be
sentenced to death, and that this decision should be based on the belief that the aggra-
vators outweigh the mitigators. In jurisdictions that require a unanimous jury deci-
sion but also do not require the jury to disclose which aggravators they found to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the instructions are similar.187 Therefore, espe-
cially when the jury’s sentence is only advisory, if the aggravators remain undisclosed,
the judge’s final sentence is necessarily arbitrary. This is true because the judge does
not know upon which facts the jury relied in making its recommendation and therefore
the judge must impose a sentence without the knowledge of the jury’s fact finding.
This is nothing more than guesswork. Indeed, the sentence is meted out based on the
judge’s factual findings in this circumstance, not the jury’s because the jury’s factual
finding remains unknown.
The Florida sentencing statute leaves open the very real possibility that in sub-
stance the judge, not the jury, still makes the factual findings necessary for the im-
position of the death penalty. Further increasing the haphazard nature of the Florida
sentencing structure, after the jury’s recommendation, there is a separate sentencing
hearing conducted before the judge only, where after the jury has passed judgment, the
judge may hear further evidence prior to rendering her sentence.188 This involves fact
finding. At that hearing, both the State and the defendant may introduce additional
evidence not presented to the jury.189 The judge then determines and imposes the sen-
tence. The defendant has no way of knowing whether the jury found the same aggra-
vating factors as the judge. Indeed, the judge, unaware of the aggravating factor(s)
found by the jury, may find an aggravating circumstance that was not found by the
jury while failing to find the aggravating circumstance that was found by the jury.
186 FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 22, ch. 7.11.
187 See, e.g., VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, P33.122, P33.126 (2003).
188 See, e.g., Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688, 691 (Fla. 1993).
189 See id.
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Under the current statute, the State could have presented additional evidence that
Evans qualified for an entirely different aggravating factor that the jury had never
considered. Surely, these circumstances fall under the definition of arbitrary and ran-
dom, when the judge is not using the jury’s factual finding, as required by law, to im-
pose life or death. This opens the door for the judge to use her judgment regarding
facts not law. This peels off her layer of judicial neutrality and allows her natural value
system, and even the potential for her personal biases, to sneak in.
Prior to Ring, the U.S. Supreme Court repeatedly reviewed and upheld Florida’s
capital-sentencing statute.190 The Court has repeatedly denied certiorari in case after
case when asked to review the constitutionality of Florida’s death scheme; the most
patently unconstitutional scheme in the nation.191 Florida has “executed fifty-three
individuals [since the decision in Ring, all] in reliance on the constitutionality of
Florida’s capital-sentencing statute as determined by the decisions of the U.S. Su-
preme Court.”192 If the Supreme Court struck down Florida’s death-penalty statute
after so many executions, it would appall the conscience of the community and the
nation. Florida has the second largest death row in the nation with 412 people waiting
to be executed today.193 It should, therefore, be no surprise that the Supreme Court
shies away from review of the State’s death-penalty procedures. The Court would be
placed in a no win situation: Either find the scheme constitutional, paving the path for
other jurisdictions to loosen their standards, or strike it down and shock the nation
with how long the Court permitted this procedure to continue and with how many
individuals have been put to death under its regimen. Florida courts themselves hide
from their own flawed capital scheme and refuse to abolish it. In King v. Moore,194
Justice Wells explicitly stated his belief that to strike down Florida’s death-penalty
procedures after a quarter century of Supreme Court review would “have a cata-
strophic effect on the administration of justice in Florida and seriously undermine
our citizens’ faith in Florida’s judicial system.”195
He then proceeded to assert that Florida heeding the ruling in Ring would open
the floodgates to the jam-packed death row inmates and inundate the courts with
190 See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
191 For examples of Florida death-penalty cases where certiorari was denied by the U.S.
Supreme Court, see Bottoson v. State, 813 So. 2d 31, 33–34 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied, 536
U.S. 962 (2002); Davis v. State, 703 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 930
(1998); Sims v. State, 681 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1199 (1997); Jones
v. State, 569 So. 2d 1234 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 836 (1993); Engle v. State, 438
So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1074 (1984), appeal after remand, 510 So. 2d
881 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 924 (1988); see also Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So. 2d
693, 696 n.5 (Fla. 2002).
192 Bottoson, 833 So. 2d at 698.
193 See Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
194 831 So. 2d 143 (Fla. 2002).
195 Id. at 148.
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newfound claims, making justice impossible to administer efficiently.196 Consequently,
Florida repeatedly chose to remain with the status quo until Judge Martinez’s decision
in Evans.197 As discussed, and not surprisingly, Judge Martinez was overturned and
the status quo prevailed.198 Judge Martinez’s ruling was founded on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds and although it is evident that Florida’s capital-sentencing statute does
violate the Sixth Amendment, perhaps it will have more difficulty passing appellate
review when facing both Sixth Amendment review along with the Eighth Amend-
ment review.
B. Alabama
Since 1976, Alabama judges have overridden jury verdicts 107
times. Although judges have authority to override life or death
verdicts, in 92% of overrides elected judges have overruled jury
verdicts of life to impose the death penalty.199
Alabama is a hybrid scheme. It requires that the jury unanimously agree on which
aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.200 The jurors must also note on
the jury form which aggravators they believe were proven.201 However, the jury vote
for death only needs a minimum of ten jurors to pass.202 Therefore, the jury could be
convinced that the aggravators were proven beyond a reasonable doubt but that the
mitigators outweighed them. The jurors’ vote is not a verdict, but a recommendation.
If the jurors (by a vote of ten or more) return a verdict of life because no aggravators
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, this vote is not binding on the judge.203 In this
instance, the judge is aware of which aggravators were found beyond a reasonable
doubt. This provides a great deal more information for sentencing. However, it remains
unclear, per case law, how a judge who does the actual sentencing can comport with
Apprendi, Ring, and Alleyne. If the majority vote is not binding on the judge then
presumably the judge could override this decision. This begs the question: based on
what? It is established that the judge cannot base it on facts, find an aggravator in-
valid, and then re-weigh. This statute, because it allows for a jury override, presents
196 Id.
197 Evans v. McNeil, No. 08-14402-CIV, 2011 WL 9717450 (S.D. Fla. June 20, 2011).
198 Evans v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 699 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub
nom. Evans v. Crews, 133 S. Ct. 2393 (2013).
199 The Death Penalty in Alabama: Judge Override, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (July
2011), available at http://www.eji.org/files/Override_Report.pdf.
200 ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46 (2012).
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 “It is sufficient that the trial court, which is in no way bound by the jury’s recom-
mendation concerning sentence, is required to enter specific written findings concerning the
existence or nonexistence of each aggravating circumstance.” ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (2012).
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significant problems. For example, in 2010 in Mitchell v. State,204 the jury recom-
mended life for Mr. Mitchell on four counts of capital murder.205 Because the jury
did find that aggravators existed beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge was permitted
an override.206 The judge sentenced Mr. Mitchell to death on all four counts.207 The
court held that because the override was not without standards, that it met constitu-
tional requirements and was not arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment.208
Because the jury disclosed to the judge the aggravators that it found proven beyond
a reasonable doubt, the court found the Sixth Amendment not to be an issue.209 In this
instance, the judge is speculating not as to what aggravators the jury found to exist, but
how much weight the jury chose to give them. This is not a Sixth Amendment issue
but an Eighth Amendment concern because Alabama provided no guidelines for bal-
ancing the aggravators for the judge or for a judicial override. As Katheryn Russell
stated of judicial discretion in capital sentencing:
The erosion of public confidence is only one of the possible fall-
outs from a capital sentencing scheme which allows the judge to
operate without adequate checks and balances. Not only does a
standardless scheme make a mockery of long-standing constitu-
tional protections—thereby making justified cynics out of those
who work with capital defendants—but more importantly, such a
scheme is likely to leave former and future capital jurors skeptical
at best about the value of their time, effort, and energy.210
C. Delaware
Delaware has a problematic capital-sentencing scheme. For example, pursuant
to the capital-sentencing scheme in Delaware, the jury only reports its findings re-
garding (1) whether they unanimously agree that at least one aggravator was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) whether by a preponderance of evidence the ag-
gravators outweigh the mitigators; on this question, they note how each juror votes.211
Therefore, this question need not be unanimous. The jury never makes a recommen-
dation regarding death. If the jury finds that an aggravator was not proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then the judge may not impose death. The jury never advises the
judge what aggravator they found beyond a reasonable doubt, whether they found
204 84 So. 3d 968 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010).
205 Id. at 977.
206 Id. at 990.
207 Id. at 977.
208 Id. at 994.
209 Id. at 987–90.
210 Katheryn K. Russell, The Constitutionality of Jury Override in Alabama Death Penalty
Cases, 46 ALA. L. REV. 5, 44 (1994).
211 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(A) (West 2013).
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more than one, or how many they found. Then the judge decides life or death without
knowing anything more about what the jury thought about it—the jury is dismissed
after reporting the above findings.212 Therefore, although Delaware may require the
jury to unanimously decide whether one aggravator was proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, this is all it requires of the jury. Delaware presents all of the problems dis-
cussed because the judge does not know how many aggravators the jury found or
even whether a majority agreed on one. Thus, Delaware’s capital-sentencing statute
is arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Delaware’s scheme has nonetheless been upheld by the Delaware Supreme
Court, citing “meaningful consideration” by both the judge and the jury before death
may be imposed.213 Because there is a non-binding jury recommendation followed
by a judicially imposed sentence after which the judge weighs the aggravators and
mitigators, the Delaware scheme has withstood constitutional scrutiny.214
D. Indiana
In Indiana, the jury is charged with recommending life or death to the judge
after making a finding beyond a reasonable doubt regarding the presented aggravat-
ing circumstances.215 Once the recommendation is made, the court is compelled to fol-
low that recommendation.216 However, if the jury cannot decide, they are dismissed
and the judge decides, as if it were a bench trial all along.217 The judge does not need
to give any weight to any findings by the jury; the trial continues as if they were never
there. The jury, if they reach a conclusion, must disclose the aggravators they found.
In sum, all may be well in Indiana unless the jury is deadlocked. Instead of granting
a mistrial, the statute instructs the judge to sentence the defendant as if there had never
been a jury at all.218 This is unmistakably an Eighth Amendment violation and in
violation of Ring. In dealing with the death penalty, the courts cannot try to comply
with the law properly one time and then simply give up and allow the judge to sen-
tence contrary to the law when faced with a hung jury. In fact, trying it right one time
and then giving up is not a suitable solution in most legal scenarios, especially when
life and death are involved.
E. Montana
Montana’s capital-sentencing statute is a classic arbitrary scheme. The jury is
not given an opportunity to make a recommendation.219 Once a defendant pleads or
212 Id. § 4209(d)(1).
213 Ploof v. State, 856 A.2d 539, 546 (Del. 2004).
214 See id.
215 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(d) (2013).
216 Id. § 35-50-2-9(e)(2).
217 See State v. Barker, 809 N.E.2d 312, 315 (Ind. 2004) (citing IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f)).
218 IND. CODE § 35-50-2-9(f).
219 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1) (2013).
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is found guilty of an offense for which the death penalty can be imposed, a separate
sentencing hearing is held with the same presiding judge who sentences the defen-
dant.220 The judge unilaterally decides whether the relevant circumstances exist to
sentence the defendant to death and then sentences accordingly. The statute states that
the “[sentencing] hearing must be conducted before the court alone.”221 This procedure
is a clear violation of Ring and the Sixth and Eighth Amendments as examined.
F. Nebraska
In Nebraska, the jury only considers aggravators and not mitigators. The jury
reports to the judge only whether they found that at least one aggravator was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.222 If the jury so finds, then a three judge panel convenes
to assess whether any mitigation outweighs the aggravators.223 Hence, the jury does
not provide an opinion whatsoever regarding the sentence and it never hears about
mitigation.224 Nebraska v. Gales225 found this scheme to comport with Ring. Gales
interpreted Ring to hold that the determination of “death eligibility . . . exposes the
defendant to greater punishment.”226 According to Gales, because a jury finding of the
existence of one aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt makes the defendant “death
eligible,” then no further factual findings by the jury are necessary under Ring.227
However, aggravators are not mutually exclusive from mitigators; one affects the
other. A person who only hears aggravation is likely to see the defendant in a negative
light or as a bad person. This occurs because the jury has not heard any of the defen-
dant’s mitigating circumstances. Again, humans are not drones and if they view the
defendant as a monster, they will be more likely to find that the aggravators exist. The
jury instructions do not indicate that the jury must disclose which aggravators they
found to exist, raising concerns of arbitrariness and a random, if not biased, decision.
VI. FURTHER OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL DEATH-PENALTY SENTENCING SCHEMES
The states that do not require a unanimous jury verdict are Alabama, Delaware,
Florida, Montana, and Nebraska (the last being in a hybrid sort of way).228 In Utah and
Virginia, the jury does not have to reveal aggravators found beyond a reasonable
220 See State v. Turner, 864 P.2d 235, 243 (Mont. 1993).
221 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301(1).
222 NEB. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, NEBRASKA PRACTICE
SERIES ch. 10.0(A) (2010).
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 658 N.W.2d 604 (Neb. 2003).
226 Id. at 626.
227 Id.
228 See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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doubt.229 The jury decides the sentence, not the judge.230 Thus, the issue of not re-
vealing the aggravators may present problems only when the appeals court does not
know which aggravators on which the jury relied.
As described, the fewer jurors who must agree, the more convoluted the decision-
making becomes for the judge, which increases the arbitrary nature of the procedure.
Further, jurors in nonunanimous decision schemes and hybrid schemes tend to mini-
mize deliberation and discussion: “[J]urors in hybrid states are significantly more
likely than others to deny responsibility for the defendant’s punishment, to misun-
derstand sentencing instructions, and to rush to judgment, all signs of the jury’s lack
of conscientiousness in its role as sentencer.”231
This is likely due, in part, to the ability of the jury to deflect responsibility for the
defendant’s life onto the judge. Schemes that leave the ultimate sentencing decision
to the judge and permit a judicial override allow the jury to morally and emotionally
reject responsibility for the decisionmaking. This influences the jury to lean toward
death recommendations thinking that the judge will override that recommendation
if death is not appropriate.232
Furthermore, the argument that Ring and its progeny do not apply to many death-
penalty jurisdictions on the grounds that death is already the statutory maximum sen-
tence for first-degree murder and therefore may be judicially determined also fails.
Only by the finding of aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt may a defendant con-
victed of first-degree murder receive the death penalty. Otherwise, the maximum
penalty, with no additional factual findings, is life in prison. A maximum penalty is
defined by the maximum sentence a defendant may receive without additional factual
findings upon which any enhancement is contingent. Cunningham v. California233
stated: “[T]he relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any
additional findings.”234
Florida’s and other states’ fears that change of their outmoded capital schemes
will trigger disrespect or lack of confidence in the judicial system are unwarranted.
Not only are such fears of change needless; the judges’ and the legislatures’ inaction
in fact causes community apprehension over a justice system refusing to evolve with
modern standards of decency and technology. In fact, “[a]n unprecedented federal re-
view of old criminal cases has uncovered as many as 27 death penalty convictions in
which FBI forensic experts may have mistakenly linked defendants to crimes with
229 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
230 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
231 William J. Bowers et al., The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of
the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 1003–04 (2006).
232 See id. at 962–63.
233 549 U.S. 270 (2007).
234 Id. at 283 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004)).
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exaggerated scientific testimony . . . .”235 The report stems, in part, from the long held
practice of FBI examiners’ and courts’ continued use of forensic hair comparison
analysis in defendants’ prosecution despite their knowledge that the work was flawed.
These forensic testimonies “may have led to convictions of . . . innocent people.”236
As technology evolves as it did when the world of forensic testing moved from fin-
gerprinting to DNA, it also must be recognized when other long held techniques or
procedures have become obsolete and unjust.
VII. PROPOSED IMPROVEMENTS TO CAPITAL-SENTENCING SCHEMES
When a death penalty is inevitable, the most fair and constitutional structure
would be a death-penalty scheme with jury instructions that requires the jury to ren-
der a verdict, not an advisory opinion or recommendation, and understand that their
vote must be unanimous as to the aggravators proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
to their verdict of death. This system would require clear and unambiguous jury in-
structions. The need for such instructions is beyond the scope of this Article.
A unanimous jury verdict would improve the constitutional issues raised herein
but may in turn raise other problems not discussed such as the ability of the jury to
understand the aggravators and mitigators, the task of weighing them and the rules
of doing so. Regardless of the other problems a jury verdict may raise, including an
increase in death sentences, both the Sixth and Eighth Amendments require it as the
law currently stands. Without further research into each jurisdiction’s death-penalty
sentencing jury instructions, it remains unknown whether the instructions are clear and
explicit enough for jurors to follow properly. Such an analysis likely requires empiri-
cal research. Nevertheless, history and common sense dictate that following the law,
restricting judicial discretion, and comporting with the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
will result in increased impartial outcomes.
Short of requiring a jury verdict that the judge may not override, if the jury is
rendering only a recommendation, it is advisable that the jury disclose to the judge
in the verdict form what aggravators it determined were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, requiring the jury to disclose details of their jury deliberations has
problems of its own. The jury instruction in Florida is similar to most jurisdictions on
the issue as to whether the jury may speak to anyone about their deliberations after
the conclusion of the case. Standard Florida Jury Instruction in Criminal Trials 4.2
states that: “We have recognized for hundreds of years that a jury’s deliberations,
discussions, and votes should remain their private affair as long as they wish it.”237
The jury room is recognized as a private place where jurors can speak their mind,
free of any fear of reprimand for their opinions, no matter how unpopular.238 Any
235 Spencer S. Hsu, At Least 27 Death Penalty Convictions May Be Faulty, WASH. POST,
July 18, 2013, at A1.
236 Id. at A11.
237 FLA. STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 22, ch. 4.2.
238 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737–38 (1993).
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judicial reporting requirements as to the jurors’ findings other than their verdict runs
the risk of impeding the inviolability of their deliberations. This is a “catch twenty-
two.” In other words, if a jury must divulge their specific factual findings because the
judge cannot legally make any factual findings or must avoid arbitrary guesswork,
many jurors otherwise inclined to vote for life for legitimate reasons like simple mercy
or forgiveness may find themselves in a more difficult spot in the jury room. This
is because if the jury has to report to the judge, then they also must be specific with
one another in the jury room. Jurors are specifically not required to articulate their
reasons for voting for life because such decisions may involve highly intimate and per-
sonal feelings. Reasons to vote for life may legally include mercy, forgiveness, re-
demption, or anything that compels an individual juror to believe life is appropriate.
The decisionmaking in the jury room is not, and should not be, a competing list of ag-
gravators and mitigators. Jurors may give whatever weight they feel is appropriate to
the aggravators and any mitigation. A forced disclosure of aggravators risks dimin-
ishing the power and validity of mercy and forgiveness.
Consequently, reporting the aggravators found beyond a reasonable doubt may
actually tip the scales towards a death recommendation. It most surely would influence
the judge to impose death. An exaggerated example illustrates: If a jury is presented
with ten aggravators in their jury instructions, and even if the state requires a unani-
mous jury recommendation, the disclosure of the aggravators could influence a jury
override. This can happen if the jurors all unanimously found that all ten aggravators
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt yet recommended life. In this instance, the
jury would have found that the mitigators outweigh all ten aggravators. In the instant
example, a legal sentence would be life if the jury found one mitigator outweighed all
of the ten aggravators. A compelling desire to provide life and forgiveness is legal
and can outweigh any number of aggravators. As seen in Ring and Alleyne, these are
enhancements to be determined by the jury.239 Thus, in this example, the judge would
receive a verdict form noting that ten aggravators were proven and a life recommen-
dation. She would not know what or how the mitigators outweighed the aggravators.
Then the judge would do her own sentencing and be likely to overturn this jury deci-
sion. This system risks removing faith and respect for jury recommendations and the
jury system generally.
CONCLUSION
The more judges and juries base their decisions on assuming facts and incomplete
evidence, the greater the probability that their decisions will be based on personal
preference and prejudice. If a judge must speculate and make presumptions about
a jury’s decision in order to render a sentence, then that sentence is arbitrary. When
juries deliver advisory opinions or recommendations that judges have the power to
override, and those juries do not disclose which aggravators they believed were proven
239 See supra Parts I, III.
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beyond a reasonable doubt, if any, the judge’s sentence is necessarily arbitrary and
in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Apprendi, Ring, and now Alleyne make it clear
that any fact that enhances a defendant’s sentence is an element of the offense and, as
such, must be found to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury before the
defendant’s sentence may be enhanced.
Capital-sentencing guidelines that require a unanimous sentencing verdict, man-
date that the jury disclose all aggravators they believe proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, and do not allow for a judicial override, go a long way in meeting constitutional
principles. Nonetheless, many philosophers, judges, attorneys, and the community
agree that there can be no “right way” to decide if an individual lives or dies.240
In fact, on February 11, 2014, Governor Jay Inslee denounced the death penalty
for the duration of his tenure as Governor of the State of Washington. Inslee stated:
“There have been too many doubts raised about capital punishment, there are too
many flaws in the system today . . . . There is too much at stake to accept an imper-
fect system.”241
With the community’s increasing awareness of wrongful convictions and exon-
erations, there is emerging a national shift away from the use of the death penalty.
As of March 31, 2014, there have been 314 DNA exonerations.242 Only ten percent
of felony convictions have biological evidence in which to test.243 This leaves ninety
percent of the felony convictions with no scientifically reliable method to prove their
innocence. The remainder of the inmates who may be innocent must rely on the dis-
covery of new evidence years after their convictions. It is no wonder that the commu-
nity and lawmakers are beginning to question felony convictions in general. This trend
away from executions can be seen in several states. In 2011, Oregon’s Governor is-
sued a similar moratorium as Inslee in Washington State.244 In 2013, Maryland abol-
ished the death penalty.245 Maryland was the eighteenth state to abolish the death
240 See John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1926–27, 1937 (2012).
241 Rachel La Corte, Washington Gov. Jay Inslee Suspends Death Penalty, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Feb. 11, 2014, 8:03 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/washington-gov-jay-inslee
-suspends-death-penalty.
242 See DNA Exonerations Nationwide, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject
.org/Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
243 See INNOCENCE PROJECT, REEVALUATING LINEUPS: WHY WITNESSES MAKE MISTAKES
AND HOW TO REDUCE THE CHANCE OF A MISIDENTIFICATION 3 (2009), available at http://
www.innocence project.org/docs/Eyewitness_ID_Report.pdf (citing Department of Justice
Oversight: Funding Forensic Sciences—DNA and Beyond: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 23 (2003) (statement of Michael M. Baden, M.D., Dir., Medicolegal
Investigations Unit, N.Y. State Police).
244 See La Corte, supra note 241.
245 See Ian Simpson, Maryland Becomes Latest U.S. State to Abolish Death Penalty,
REUTERS (May 2, 2013, 5:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/02/us-usa-maryland
-deathpenalty-idUSBRE9410TQ20130502.
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penalty and the sixth state to do so in six years.246 Illinois also abolished the death
penalty recently, in 2011.247 An unmistakable movement is rising as lawmakers and
the community alike are becoming more conscious and informed.
Nevertheless, the death penalty remains in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. If
life and death decisions must be made, there can be a more objective and less preju-
dicial way to make such a decision. Notably, Justice Brennan always opposed the
death penalty as a violation of the Eighth Amendment and condemned it as defying
human dignity and the sanctity of life.248 Supreme Court Justices in particular often re-
canted their views on the death penalty or opposed any death-penalty scheme entirely.
Memorably, Justice Blackmun renounced his views on the death penalty shortly be-
fore his retirement in 1994 stating, “I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply
to concede that the death-penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self-evident to
me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations can ever
save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies.”249
In addition, Justice Stevens voiced his regret that in 1976 he voted to uphold the
constitutionality of a Texas law that authorized many subsequent death sentences.250
Justice Ginsberg is known to question the death-penalty process and lack of quality rep-
resentation death row inmates receive.251 Moreover, Justice Powell admitted that he
felt he voted the wrong way in McCleskey v. Kemp.252 Had Justice Powell recognized
his mistake sooner, Warren McCleskey would still be alive. Such regret and changes
of heart are unmistakable indicators that judicial decisions or any decision made by a
human being regarding the issue of life and death can be arbitrary and based on factors
other than the law.
The community is becoming less and less inclined to support the death penalty,253
and the death penalty is reserved for only the most extreme and cruel murders. The pur-
pose of aggravators is to limit the pool of individuals eligible for the death penalty.254
Therefore, to continue to widen judicial discretion regarding death-penalty sentencing
is contrary to community principles.
246 Id.
247 See Ariane de Vogue & Barbara Pinto, Illinois Abolishes Death Penalty; 16th State to
End Executions, ABC NEWS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/illinois-16th-state
-abolish-death-penalty/story?id=13095912.
248 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 305 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
249 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 86 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring); Interview by George
Stephanopoulos with Justice John Paul Stevens (Sept. 29, 2011), available at http://www.abc
news.go.com/blogs/politics/2011/09/transcript-my-interview-with-justice-john-paul-stevens/.
251 Statements on the Death Penalty by Supreme Court Justices, Justice Ginsburg, DEATH
PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/statements-death-penalty-supreme
-court-justices#ginsburg (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
252 JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 451 (1994) (citing McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
253 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
254 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983).
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Each individual, including the judge, possesses private and intimate views and
partialities integral to their sense of self and personality. No lawyer can purge the judge
or jury of their internal and personal predispositions. There can be no doubt that death
is different. Humans are the only living creatures who recognize their own mortality.
Religious worship in the United States demonstrates that individuals cope with their
mortality in vastly different ways. America is defined in part by how its citizens view
their mortality—from Atheists, Muslims, and Buddhists to Catholics and Protestants.
Churchgoing or not, views of life, death, salvation, and redemption are delicate and
personal to each individual. These views are central to the core of one’s person and
not easily put aside in the jury room; in fact it is not likely possible. As stated by
Chief Justice Earl Warren, “The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”255
When facing the finality and severity of the punishment of death, can there be
room for personal prejudices and preconceptions? While the improvements discussed
would drastically mend the arbitrary nature of death sentencing, these procedures
are not a complete solution because human bias and prejudice will always be a part
of the judicial system, regardless of the number of rules or guidelines the legislature
imposes. The question remains: How much potential for bias is the community willing
to tolerate when the outcome can end a human life? Can the legal community main-
tain confidence in the jury system under the current capital-sentencing systems? The
U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to address these issues only further compounds these
problems. Justice John Harlan proposed that a nonarbitrary sentencing system cannot
be established, “calling the task of articulating the characteristics of who should live
and who should die beyond human ability.”256 The community will not be satisfied
with the status quo. Judges or legislatures who do eventually strike down death-penalty
statutes in Florida and states similar to Florida will be applauded by the community
and the nation with renewed faith and trust in the jury system.
255 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
256 EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 303 (2013).
